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This paper proposes a simple framework to examine organizational methods of knowledge protection.
The framework highlights a basic trade-o¤ between improving decision-making and innovation through
communication and mitigating security risks by imposing restrictions on communication ows. The
trade-o¤ is mediated by factors such as the sensitivity of information, the degree to which employees
can be trusted to handle sensitive information appropriately, and rms investments in legal protec-
tion mechanisms. Evidence from HP Labs supports the basic predictions of the model, in particular
the importance of employee trustworthiness and internalized codes of behavior in promoting open
communication. Our interviews also suggest a potential conict between two of the most important
appropriability mechanisms: secrecy and lead-time advantage.
Keywords: Secrecy, information security, organization design, trust, innovation, appropriability mech-
anisms.
JEL Classication: L14, L23, M10, M14.
Apples obsession for secrecy is legendary. Big projects are divided into small teams and
employees are told not to fraternize with members of other groups, lest someone gain access
to the bigger picture (New York Times, July 10, 2008).1
1 Introduction
What advantages do rms, as a nexus of contracts, have over markets, as a nexus of rms? A widespread
view, usually associated with the knowledge-based view of the rm, is that rms have superior capabilities
in managing knowledge assets (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).
One particular capability that rms may have developed is the ability to protect valuable information
(Liebeskind, 1996; Rajan and Zingales, 2001). Client lists, customer information, non-patented technical
1See http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/apple-imposes-gag-rule (accessed 26/08/2011).
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knowledge are examples of information that, if leaked, may compromise a rms source of competitive
advantage and reputation. To protect this information, rms employ a variety of methods including the
use of secure IT infrastructure, the screening and monitoring of employees, restrictions to communication
ows, and requirements that employees and contractors sign nondisclosure agreements.
In this paper we explore a fundamental trade-o¤. On the one hand, rms often encourage interactions
and knowledge sharing among employees to improve decision-making and foster innovation. On the
other hand, rms also sometimes restrict employeesaccess to information to prevent information leakage
(Liebeskind, 1996; Hannah, 2005). We propose a simple framework that highlights a number of factors
that are likely to inuence whether communication ows should be restricted or kept open. These include
the sensitivity of information, employee trustworthiness, and various legal instruments such as patents
and non-disclosure agreements that organizations can use to mitigate the risk of information leakage.
Then we examine how HP Labs the research unit of Hewlett-Packard Company (HP) internally
protects its knowledge in practice. Previous research on the management of R&D labs (e.g., Tushman
and Katz, 1980; Katz and Tushman, 1981; Chesbrough, 2002; Von Zedtwitz, 2004) and science-based
businesses (e.g., Gambardella, 1995; Pisano, 2006) has paid scant attention to organizational (as opposed
to patent-based) methods of knowledge protection. Exceptions are Zhao (2006) and Quan and Chesbrough
(2010), who examine how the geographical segmentation of the R&D process can be used to protect
intellectual property (IP) rights. Our evidence complements this limited body of work by providing a
more comprehensive analysis of organizational knowledge protection methods.
Supporting the idea that information items are heterogeneous in security requirements, we nd that,
while managers and researchers at HP Labs all emphasize the importance of open communication in
facilitating their work, sometimes restrictions are imposed on the communication of certain kinds of
sensitive information. Auditing who has access to what information is also an important element of
HP Labs knowledge protection policy. For instance, as part of a software development project, special
software tags were used to provide a clearer audit trail for the distribution within HP Labs of sensitive
source code. Geographical separation can hinder interactions among partners, especially when other
restrictions to communication are also present. In one case, di¢ culties occurred because of rules related
to the encryption of electronic messages, which could not easily be overcome via informal communication.
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Consistent with our framework, we also nd that open communication at HP Labs is supported
by internalized codes of behavior. HP Labs delegates many decisions concerning security to employees
and trusts them, by and large, to behave appropriately. Training and mentoring are important tools
for establishing the appropriate norms and standards of behavior regarding security. One reason why
internalization of norms may be emphasized is that many types of communication may be very di¢ cult
if not impossible to monitor or audit. Relational contracts also appear to be important (Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy, 2002; Gibbons and Henderson, 2012; Baldwin and Henkel, 2015). HP Labs researchers
understand that failure to behave appropriately regarding security will be detrimental to their career
prospects, not just at HP but at similar organizations as well.
Two unexpected ndings emerged from our interviews. The rst was about the type of information
that was most likely to be protected. Within a leading research lab, we expected technical information to
be very closely guarded. We found instead that protecting client condentiality was always deemed to be
of the utmost importance. While technical information was sometimes classied as sensitive, in general
other leading technology rms were not expected to engage in espionage activities or stimulate a market
for stolen information. HP Labs employees were much more strongly concerned about protecting client
information and condentiality. This may partly reect the needs of HP Labscustomers, which include
government agencies and nancial institutions.
A second unexpected nding related to the reasons for preferring open communication modes to more
secure/restricted communication modes. We expected restrictions to communication to potentially reduce
the quality of decision-making or hinder creativity. By contrast, HP Labs employees emphasized more
frequently the issue of delays. Security protocols were sometimes a problem because they tended to slow
down new product development. This nding has interesting implications for managers. The innovation
literature nds that secrecy and lead-time advantage are two of the most important methods that rms
can use to appropriate the returns from their R&D e¤orts (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Arundel,
2001; Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Our evidence indicates that there may be a conict between these two
appropriability mechanisms. Security protocols help protect intellectual property, but they may also
introduce delays, thus compromising lead-time advantage.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing research on knowledge
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protection in organizations. Section 3 provides a simple framework to understand when organizations
should restrict access to information, and when instead should keep it open. Section 4 describes and
analyzes our interview data. Section 5 discusses our ndings and highlights potential avenues for future
research.
2 Related literature
The literature on knowledge protection in rms is scattered through economics, management and engi-
neering. In an important paper, Liebeskind (1996) argues that rms possess specic capabilities that
allow them to protect their knowledge from expropriation and imitation more e¤ectively than market
contracting. Protecting knowledge is di¢ cult because knowledge resides in the heads of individuals and
is thus inherently mobile. Moreover, the creation of new knowledge frequently requires interaction. As a
result, organizations involved in innovative activities may be concerned that several people get access to
valuable or sensitive information.
Liebeskind (1996, 1997) describes a number of methods that rms can use to protect their knowledge.
These methods include employee participation in share ownership schemes, the design of long-term com-
pensation packages, and the compartmentalization of organizational knowledge. By sharing ownership,
rms can provide powerful incentives that can induce key individuals to commit to a particular organi-
zation. Deferred rewards also reduce employee mobility by imposing exit costs on employees. Examples
of deferred rewards include staggering promotions over time, deferred stock options and pension plans
with delayed vesting. Contractual clauses such as the exclusivity of the employment relationship and
non-compete and condentiality clauses also tend to reduce the value of employment elsewhere, and
therefore tend to make employees more loyal to their organization.
Quite distinct from these methods are features of job design and communication structures that tend
to compartmentalize organizational knowledge. Hannah (2005) classies restrictions to communication
ows into two groups: access restrictions rules that restrict employees rights to access certain areas
of an organization or documents and handling procedures rules that specify what employees can and
cannot do with sensitive information once they gain access to it. Examples of communication restrictions
include rules that require an employee to conduct her work in a particular place within its premises (and
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not enter other areas of its premises), and that the employee communicate with, and report to, particular
other employees (and not communicate with other specic employees)(Liebeskind, 1996: 98-99).
A concern with open communication in rms is that it may facilitate unwanted knowledge spillovers or
spin-o¤s. For instance, Bhide (2000) nds that the vast majority of the founders of 1989 Inc. 500 fastest
growing private companies adapted ideas they had encountered in their previous jobs. Moreover, about
ninety percent of entrepreneurs in high-tech and professional service industries were previously employed
in established rms in the same sector (Burton, Sorensen and Beckman, 2002; Gompers, Lerner and
Scharfstein, 2005). Knowledge protection issues are especially prominent when evaluating outsourcing
opportunities to countries like China, where the potential for information leakage and competition from
local rms is high (Newhouse, 2007).
A number of formal models examine organizational strategies for knowledge protection. Demski,
Lewis, Yao and Yildirim (1999) nd that market forces are typically insu¢ cient alone to induce rms to
protect customer information. However, rms may be able to signal their intention to protect customer
information, for instance by providing specic client contracts or by erecting internal security systems.
Rønde (2001) examines how restricting information sharing between employees a¤ects rm prots. In his
model, information sharing improves operational e¢ ciency but makes information leakage more likely. He
focuses on how this trade-o¤ is a¤ected by the degree of competition in the market. Fosfuri and Rønde
(2004) study how rmsincentives to cluster together are a¤ected by stronger trade secrets laws. Rajan
and Zingales (2001) focus on hierarchy and staggered rm growth as methods to protect a rms source of
competitive advantage. Baldwin and Henkel (2015) compare di¤erent knowledge protection mechanisms
(doing nothing, licensing, and relational contracts), and evaluate how these options are a¤ected by the
modularity of the system and the degree of employee trustworthiness.
An extensive empirical literature examines how rms appropriate the returns from their R&D activities
(Cohen et al., 2000; Arundel, 2001; de Faria and Sofka, 2010; Gallié and Legros, 2012; Thomä and Bizer,
2013; Sofka et al., 2014; Belenzon and Patacconi, 2014). This literature distinguishes between formal
or legal appropriability mechanisms such as patenting, trademarks and copyrights, and informal
appropriability mechanisms such as secrecy, lead-time advantage, and complementary assets. A common
nding is that, except in a few sectors such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, patenting is often not
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the most important appropriability mechanism. Other mechanisms, most notably secrecy (especially for
process innovation) and lead-time advantage, are more e¤ective. For instance, based on a 1994 survey of
1478 R&D labs in the U.S. manufacturing sector, Cohen et al. (2000: 1) nd that, among appropriability
mechanisms, patents tend to be the least emphasized by rms in the majority of manufacturing industries,
and secrecy and lead time tend to be emphasized most heavily. Using data from the 1993 European
Community Innovation Survey, Arundel (2001) nds that secrecy is rated as more valuable than patents
by a higher percentage of rms in all size classes. Thomä and Bizer (2013) show that, among innovative
small rms in Germany that choose to protect their innovations at all, informal protection mechanisms
(lead time, secrecy, complexity of design) tend to be the most heavily emphasized.
While this literature underscores the importance of secrecy as an appropriability mechanism, very
little is known about how secrecy is implemented in practice. As mentioned above, Zhao (2006) and
Quan and Chesbrough (2010) are notable exceptions. These papers show that multinational companies
counter weak IP rights protection in host countries by geographically segmenting the R&D process. Labs
in countries with weak IP rights protection tend to perform tasks whose full value emerges only when
combined with other internal resources, thus mitigating the risk of knowledge spillovers. Png also nds
that stronger legal protection of trade secrets is associated with greater R&D spending (Png, 2017a)
and, conditional on R&D spending, a decline in patenting especially in complex product industries (Png,
2017b).
3 Conceptual framework
Building on the body of research discussed above, this section proposes a simple framework to inform our
analysis of knowledge protection practices at HP Labs. The framework is summarized in Figure 1. In the
online appendix, we also provide a mathematical model where some of the key ideas discussed here are
formalized.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Our analysis is motivated by a chasm in the innovation literature. On the one hand, communication,
information sharing and interactions among employees are widely regarded as essential features of innov-
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ative organizations. Open communication is believed to improve decision-making, facilitate coordination
and foster creativity and innovation inside organizations (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Rønde, 2001). On
the other hand, when employees have access to a substantial portion of a rms knowledge, leakage of
information is more likely to occur (Liebeskind, 1996; Rønde, 2001). Some employees, for instance, may
leave the rm and set up competing rms using their former employers trade secrets. A solution could
be compartmentalizing a rms knowledge and restricting communication ows. Secrecy has consistently
been found a very e¤ective mechanisms to appropriate the returns from R&D (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000;
Arundel, 2001).
Google provides a nice illustration of the risks that wide access to corporate information can bring
about. According to former Google executives Eric Schmidt and Jonathan Rosenberg, the default mode
at Google is to share virtually everything. The companys intranet, Moma, includes information on just
about every upcoming product, for example [...] We trust our employees with all sorts of vital information
(Schmidt and Rosenberg, 2015: 176-177). Yet, not all Googles employees may deserved that level of trust.
In February 2017, Waymo, the self-driving-car division that spun out of Google in December 2016, led a
lawsuit against Uber alleging that Googles former employee Anthony Levandowski stole more than 14,000
documents (9.7 gigabytes of data) from Google. Just weeks after Levandowski downloaded this documents
from Googles servers, Levandowski left the company to start Otto, a self-driving-truck company, which
six months later was acquired by Uber for an estimated 680 million dollars. Waymo claims that Uber
and Levandowski used the stolen information to jump-start Ubers self-driving car program.2
In this paper we argue that organizations must strike a balance between sharing information internally,
which improves decision-making and innovation, and restricting communication ows, which reduces
information leakage. Thus, in practice organizations will put systems and procedures in place so as to
balance the benets of open communication against the risks of information leakage.
In striking this balance, organizations must take several factors into account. One key factor is the
nature of information. Information that is sensitive and imposes very large costs if leaked will be handled
securely by the organization. Information that is less sensitive and is deemed critical for decision-making
2See, e.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_(company) and the references therein for more information. Accessed
20/10/2017.
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and new product development will be shared more widely. The idea that information is heterogeneous
in terms of security risk is captured by the common practice of classifying documents based on their
sensitivity, for instance condentialor private. Studies have found that knowledge tends to be most
closely guarded when it is highly tacit and core (Norman, 2002), and that external information leakage is
especially detrimental when knowledge is related to radical innovations (Li, Eden, Hitt and Ireland, 2008;
Ritala, Husted, Olander and Michailova, 2018).
A second factor that can inuence how freely organizations will share information internally is the
degree to which they trust their employees to handle sensitive information appropriately. As highlighted
in Schmidt and Rosenbergs quote above, Google trusts its employees with all sorts of vital information.
Google has experienced leaks, but does its best to track down the source of leaks and, when the leaks come
from Googlers, those Googlers get red (Schmidt and Rosenberg, 2015: 177). Indeed, severe penalties
in case of misconduct may support trust of the calculative type because violations of trust will tend not
to benet the untrustworthy partner. An extensive body of research supports the notion that trusting
relationships are conducive to information sharing (e.g., Uzzi, 1996, 1997; Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Dyer
and Chu, 2003), for instance in the context of knowledge-intensive work such as research and development
(Norman, 2002; Levin and Cross, 2004).
Third, organizations may be more willing to share information internally if they invest signicant re-
sources in legal protection mechanisms such as patents, employee non-compete clauses and non-disclosure
agreements. Patents, by establishing temporary monopoly rights over the use of inventions, mitigate
the risks of imitation and expropriation of intellectual property. Non-compete clauses reduce the risk
that an employee, upon termination or resignation, may start a competing business or begin working
for a competitor. The concern is that workers may gain undue competitive advantage from their expo-
sure to their former employers condential information (e.g., client lists, trade secrets). Non-disclosure
agreements are contracts where parties agree not to disclose information covered by the agreement. Ar-
guably, the more organizations invest in protecting their knowledge through legal mechanisms, the less
they will have to rely on informalappropriability mechanisms such as restricting communication ows
and compartmentalizing information.
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To summarize, we propose that restrictions to internal communication ows are less likely to be
imposed when: (i) information is important for decision-making and innovation and the cost of information
leakage is low (that is, the information is not sensitive); (ii) rms trust their employees to handle sensitive
information appropriately; (iii) rms invest resources in legal protection mechanisms such as patents,
employee non-compete clauses and non-disclosure agreements.
Often information is shared not just internally among rm employees, but also externally with business
partners, suppliers and customers. A large literature examines the paradox of openness, whereby
rms collaborate with external partners to innovate and commercialize their inventions, but at the same
time must also prevent harmful knowledge spillovers and capture su¢ cient returns from innovation (e.g.,
Hamel, 1991; Laursen and Salter, 2014; Ritala, Olander, Michailova and Husted, 2015; Arora, Belenzon
and Patacconi, 2017).
Compared to information sharing within the rm, external information sharing is regarded to be more
prone to hazards. This is especially true when external partners are competitors or may become one
after absorbing the rms distinctive competencies (Khanna, Gulati and Nohria, 1998). The ability of
a focal rm to control how information is used across the organizational boundary may also be limited.
Compared to markets, rms are believed to have superior capabilities in managing knowledge assets and
protecting information (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996; Liebeskind, 1996; Nahapiet and Ghoshal,
1998). These capabilities derive from rmsabilities to compartmentalize information and incentivize good
security practices, for instance through deferred compensation or ownership shares (Liebeskind, 1996).
They may also derive from socialization mechanisms that engender trust among employees and allow them
to internalize social norms (Ouchi, 1980; Bowles, 1998; Adler, 2001; Ramalingam and Rauh, 2010). Thus,
the context in which information sharing occurs (whether within the rm or across organizations) can
inuence the cost-benet analysis of information restrictions not only directly by a¤ecting for instance
the magnitude of security risks, but also indirectly by a¤ecting moderators such as the trustworthiness of
the information recipient.
If agency problems are typically more severe across rms than within, and rms are able to handle
information more securely than markets, then we would expect restrictions to communication ows to be
more common across organizational boundaries than within organizational boundaries.
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4 Knowledge protection at HP Labs
In this section, we examine knowledge protection strategies in a specic but important context the large
corporate lab. Our evidence comes from HP Labs. HP Labs has two major research facilities, one in Palo
Alto in the U.S. and one in Bristol in the U.K. From its inception in 1966, HP Labss stated objectives have
been to carry on basic and applied research studies, to assist the operating divisions in nding solutions
to their technical problems, and, if necessary, to develop prototype products in new and promising elds
(WR Hewlett, quoted from House and Price, 2009: 105). Important discoveries attributable to HP Labs
include the pocket calculator, the RISC architecture for computer chips, cordless pointing devices, and
the 64 bit Itanium chipsets developed jointly with Intel. The objectives of HP Labs have not changed
materially in over four decades.3
The normal operating procedure for a development phase at HP Labs is to conduct a research project,
often in collaboration with universities. The research project may result in tools or solutions with com-
mercial potential being developed. If this happens, the tools or solutions are then normally shipped to the
relevant business unit within HP for further development and possibly commercialization, or a new unit
is spun out with external partners such as other rms or a government department (this is particularly
the case for defence related activities).
We chose HP Labs for this study for a number of reasons. First, HP Labs is one of the largest private
research labs in the world. Issues related to knowledge protection are likely to be particularly important
for such a concern. Moreover, the lab has operated successfully for more than half a century, suggesting
that its knowledge protection practices are of the highest standard.
Second, HP Labs is a very interesting organization in its own right. There is signicant variation
in how the research function in major technology companies is carried out,4 but most would agree that
3On October 6, 2014, HP initiated a plan to split the PC and printers business from its enterprise products and services
business resulting in two publicly traded companies: HP Inc. and Hewlett Packard Enterprise. This does not e¤ect our
analysis as the component of HP Labs we have spoken to has solely been in the enterprise services division for many years
and there was little impact of this restructuring on the individuals involved.
4Apple, for example, has tended to embed small research groups directly into the product teams for various business
units (Apple 2010 Quarterly Report). By contrast, HP and IBM have established large standalone research units charged
with conducting basic and applied research and developing integrated proofs of concept packaged for existing and/or new
product units (HP Labs Annual Report 2010 and IBM Research, Annual Report 2010). Somewhere between these models is
the Microsoft approach, where basic research is conducted by a standalone research group and applied research is integrated
into the various business units (Microsoft Research 2010).
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the major research labs are an important part of the mix. Research suggests that many leading rms in
developed countries are withdrawing from science (Arora, Belenzon and Patacconi, 2018). Hence, there is
a need to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of large research labs, for instance with respect
to knowledge protection.
Lastly, and most importantly for research purposes, we had very good access to key personnel in HP
Labs. For studies focusing on security issues, access to key personnel is often a major roadblock. The
present case study developed during the conduct of a research project on information security in a cloud
environment. The authors suggested, and HP Labs agreed, to conduct interviews to establish a baseline
for a cloud ecosystem, as a collaborative development tool within and across organizations. The trust
and knowledge built up by the research team over several years of interactions with personnel in HP Labs
was fundamental both for carrying out the study and for the interpretation of the data.5
4.1 Methodology and data collection
We began our investigation by gathering extensive secondary data and performing documentary analysis
of the available resources on HP and HP Labs, including the HP Labs library and archive at Bristol, in
addition we looked extensively at similar organizations, from multiple archival sources. These include:
(i) books, published case studies and articles on HP and similar organizations, with special focus on
the management of innovation and large labs (e.g., House and Price, 2009; Lashinsky, 2012; Gertner,
2012; Schmidt and Rosenberg, 2015). We also consulted (ii) HP and HP Labs websites, and other online
sources, through extensive Google searches (e.g., Annual Reports, HP Labs publications, news articles). In
particular, we read and in many cases discussed with the authors several HP Labs working papers on issues
related to information security, innovation and privacy management. HP Labs sta¤produce large numbers
of internal and external publications; from these, we selected several (about 30) that we most relevant for
our study. Attention was paid to ensure the authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning of
the documentary sources (Bryman, 2004). Attention was also directed towards consciously recognizing
that in re-reading text it may become interpreted within the current context and thus reconstructed
outside the original meaning of the author (Hodder, 2003).
5Yin (2011) identies gatekeepers who provide access and facilitation for qualitative research. In our study the lab director
performed this role and allowed us access to a cross section of roles within the lab.
11
In addition to archival sources, we conducted (iii) semi-structured recorded interviews with represen-
tative participants from the various levels of the hierarchy in HP Labs, as suggested by Denis, Lamothe
and Langley (2001). We had access to over 60 engineers, researchers and commercial managers based on
a single research site. For availability and condentiality reasons, we focused on ve members of sta¤.
Specically, we interviewed the lab director (LD), a senior research manager (SRM), a research engineer
who works on multiple projects (RE1), a second more senior research engineer with expertise in security
policy (RE2), and an external liaison o¢ cer with another business unit in Hewlett Packard (EL).6 These
ve members of HP Labs were selected to be broadly representative of the complete organizational struc-
ture of the individual lab site examined in this study. Indeed, the sample covers all levels of sta¤ from
frontline engineers to the most senior lab manager, just below board level. They are themselves experts in
the information technology aspects of security and intimately involved in key HP Labsbusiness processes.
Appendix 1 provides a brief description of their roles.
Each interview lasted for approximately one and one-half hours with some variation.7 We recorded
approximately 50 minutes of each interview. The remaining time was used before the interview to discuss
the question sheet and after the recorded interview to engage in further discussion. For the post-interview
session, notes were taken. In one case (EL), we asked that part of this discussion also be recorded as we felt
that the discussion contained valuable ancillary information. The interviews were then transcribed and
merged with the set of extra notes taken during the unrecorded part of the conversation. The objective
was to provide the participants with maximum control over their information while collecting as much
data as possible. In total this resulted in just under 10 hours of interviews, about 5 hours of recordings,
and about 45 pages of transcripts (including some extra notes from the interviewer). We have anonymized
parts of the interviews to ensure that specic individuals cannot be identied from the data presented.8
Interviews were conducted on-site over a period of two days and were structured as follows. A
question sheet was circulated to the participants two weeks prior to the interview dates. The rst three
6The external liaison o¢ cer (EL) acts as an intermediary between the research unit and the commercial part of the
business. The EL provides insight to the research team regarding current customer requirements and feeds back to the
research unit on the response of customers to prototypes of tools and solutions tested by them.
7Two interviews lasted more than two hours.
8For each quote from the interviews, we identify the quote by the designation of the interviewee who made the comment
in square brackets. Within the text we follow the standard convention and add missing subjects, pronouns and conjunctives,
in square brackets. Signicant grammatical or logical errors are tagged with the sic erat scriptum [sic] identier.
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interviews were conducted on day one and the second two interviews were conducted on day two. Despite
the fact that interviews were conducted on-site, each was conducted in private and interviewees were
explicitly given autonomy to answer questions as they preferred. All interviews were conducted by the
principal investigator of the research team.
We started our interviews by requesting participants to describe their position within HP Labs. This
provided some background for the following discussion. The subsequent questions focused on identifying
methods for knowledge protection and the costs and benets associated with them. We were also interested
in understanding whether the use of knowledge protection methods was contingent on the identity of the
parties involved in knowledge exchange (i.e., collaboration with other HP Labs employees, or other
HP units, or external organizations). The complete set of questions is provided in Appendix 2. Data
coding and analysis concerning procedures for knowledge sharing and protection, both within and between
organizational boundaries, were manually conducted (see Appendix 3).
Following Strauss (1987) and Corbin and Strauss (2015), we analyzed the data using a processcoding
approach. This is a cyclical approach where the general meaning of the discussions conducted within the
semi-structured interviews is initially categorized (initiation), structured around specic themes (focus)
and then reviewed and encoded (axial coding). All the material was reviewed to check that we had grasped
what was signicant to the interviewee (respondent validation; see also Charmaz, 2014). Subsequently,
items were reduced into a more manageable form of themes or setsand triangulated via inter-researcher
verication and with interviewees (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013).
To further enhance the validity of our ndings, we include in the discussion below extensive verbatim
descriptions of the participantsviews, to reduce the impact of our own biases. We conrmed through
internal written records that the views of our participants regarding security practices were more widely
shared within HP Labs. Descriptions of security practices in other leading U.S. technology rms (e.g.,
Lashinsky, 2012; Schmidt and Rosenberg, 2015) suggest that our ndings also have some external validity,
at least in a developed country context. Nevertheless, given that our study includes only a single site
and a small number of interviews, concerns about validity remain justied and further work is certainly
needed.
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4.2 Information ows and security risk
As mentioned above, HP Labss main role is in conducting basic and applied research that develops new
technology and supports business processes. Since knowledge generation is the labs main objective, a
policy of openness and collaboration within the organization is considered to be the norm. For instance,
the Lab Director noted that:
HP Labs consciously decided several years ago to try to keep as much information in the open
between employees inside [the] lab so that you could get that kind of cross pollination [and]
fertilization of ideas from di¤erent groups. At one level we operated [a] fairly open internet
where a lot of people have access to quite sensitive information and the decision was always
[that] the upside in doing that outweighs the risk associated with it.[LD]
Nevertheless, all the people we interviewed also conrmed that there is information which they do not
share or share only on a need-to-know basis. Most restrictions involve shared information from partner
organizations or customers. In particular, information shared by public bodies is tightly controlled.9
Ongoing business activities with large clients rely on trust in security and data-handling procedures.
Leakages of information have a real two-fold impact. First, there are often built-in penalties for the
exposure of sensitive information (including criminal liability in certain cases). Second, and arguably
most importantly, is the potential loss of future business, both from the client whose information was
exposed and from other prospective customers. Since the size of contracts is frequently very large, such
a loss can be a signicant percentage of total turnover.
It is felt that competitors might be interested in information on HP business strategy that could be
inferred from the research lines undertaken at HP Labs. Hence, information related to ongoing commercial
projects and strategy is protected even within HP Labs. However, basic research output from HP Labs is,
in the main, freely disclosed internally and in certain circumstances published in the public domain. In
practice, such information may only be of use to similar research organizations which share similar norms
9For instance, the LD noted that: If we have information from our business units that is sensitive then it is not widely
circulated across the organization. That is more controlled. Similarly, if we have information from partners this is tightly
controlled. If we are working with this type of information, which is intranet based we will be working in quite a guarded even
in the immediate organization. [...] The only places where we would be really tight, is our stu¤ related to the government.
This would not make it onto the intranet. We would keep that sort of material of the intranet, keep it separately on machines
that are air gapped. But this is a very small amount of material and the philosophy is that you would destroy it as quickly
as you can. This avoids having copies that could be embarrassing to anyone at any stage. We try and keep it open, but if
we have an intern we try and share enough that they know what is going on and can be a part of HP. [LD]
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of ethical practice with HP Labs and are unlikely to use this information to gain undue advantage in the
research arena.10
Information provided by HP Labs to other business units within HP is not routinely restricted. To
the extent that such information is controlled, it is often because of a concern that new innovations may
be revealed prematurely. Disclosing capabilities or products that are still under development at HP Labs
runs the risk of creating inappropriate expectations on the part of other HP divisions or customers. Hence,
some restriction on information transmission within HP may benet to all parties.
4.3 Knowledge protection methods
Our interviews highlighted a number of methods that HP Labs sta¤ use to protect sensitive or valuable
information. These methods are discussed below.
Internalized codes of behavior. Decisions concerning the sharing of information are often left to the
individual. Hence, it is important that employees have a clear understanding of what is expected of them
from a security standpoint.
The LD emphasized that lab employees are loyal to the company and have good to excellent knowledge
of how to deal with sensitive information. The research sta¤ are top eld experts who are aware of security
concerns and want to protect intellectual property in an appropriate manner. HP assists the e¤orts of
HP sta¤members by providing a structured way to deal with sensitive information. For example, the EL
made the following observation:
Within HP there is a standard of business conduct which is very clear on what information
should be shared and again that comes back down to the data classication: whether it is HP
private, HP condential, or information that can be made public.[EL]
Standards of business conduct and cultural norms are transmitted explicitly via training sessions that
provide a set of structured principles regarding knowledge protection. These principles are also built into
employee contracts and reinforced through continuous mentoring of more junior sta¤. Lab employees
tended to emphasize (a) discretion and (b) the use of experience within the research group, in deciding on
10 It is also important to note that most of the research conducted at HPL would require substantial technical infrastructure
to make it economically viable. This infrastructure is found in only a few businesses, and a secondary market for illicitly
obtained information does not exist.
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how information should be distributed amongst researchers. Every person whom we interviewed stressed
that cultural norms and internalized codes of behavior are the primary means for ensuring good security
practice.
Auditing. The LD also pointed out that legal liability is always needed as a back-stopremedy when
informal measures for securing cooperation in knowledge protection are not su¢ cient. Auditing is an
important element of such a strategy. HP Labs uses both passive and active auditing procedures. An
open sharing of information is viewed as good as long as there is an audit trail to verify who has looked
at the information.
The SRM discussed an example of software development that provides an illustration of the importance
that HP Labs places on auditing. Software development involves the writing and testing of source code,
which is the underlying code used to generate the software. The software is typically distributed to end
users only as binary les ready for running on a computer. Unlike the binary les, someone who possesses
the source code can potentially understand the program and reproduce or modify the software. Hence,
the source code represents particularly sensitive information in the context of a software development
project.
To permit development and testing of the software, the source code must be shared among individuals
working on the project. As part of the security for the project discussed by the SRM, identifying tags
were placed directly into the copies of the source code provided to these individuals. Hence, any version
of the source code found to have been leaked could be traced back to the small number of copies that were
originally distributed. This procedure allowed for the construction of an audit trail that (a) incentivized
good security handling of important information and (b) provided a means to monitor the dissemination
of critically sensitive information.
In the experience of several of the individuals with whom we spoke, this method of controlling infor-
mation was found to be e¤ective. However, it was not without cost. The tagging procedure delayed the
distribution of the source code and increased the time it took for the project to be completed. Thus, as
discussed in our model, there was a trade-o¤ between security and operational performance. Interestingly,
however, the cost of heightened security was not so much in terms of lack of coordination, but rather in
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terms of longer delays.
Auditing and geographical separation. The impact of auditing on the ability to transmit information
across geographical areas was addressed by many of the researchers we interviewed. For example, the EL
argued that:
Auditing implies that certain bits of information are not transmitted. Here physical separa-
tion matters a bit. If you are not on premise, you cannot rely on informal communication,
which is hard to monitor. Working o¤-premise create[s] coordination problems.[EL]
One role for informal communication appears to be that of facilitating access to legitimate communication
channels. One researcher who is restricted from obtaining certain information can nevertheless informally
request the information from a second researcher. The second researcher can then outline a properly
audited mechanism for sharing this information. Thus o¤ the record comms are valuable (EL quote)
because they permit researchers to e¢ ciently obtain information.
Geographical distance also matters because organizations working in di¤erent countries may have
di¤erent security protocols and communications sent outside an organization may be subject to additional
restrictions. The coordination problems that arose as a result of a collaboration with researchers working
in a developing country were discussed by RE1 and RE2. Some of the problems occurred because of
rules in the developing country which required electronic messages to be encrypted. On the other hand,
because of internal auditing rules, the norm at HP Labs is to send and receive electronic messages as clear
text. These di¤erences in procedures caused delays and additional work for HP Labs employees.
Other methods. The individuals we interviewed stressed the importance of cultural norms, training,
and auditing as means by which HP Labs engages in knowledge protection. However, other methods also
play a role. For instance, there are special formal procedures which must be followed to obtain access
to certain business sensitive documents. Non-disclosure clauses are also included in contracts and are
considered to be a credible threat to be used in the unusual case of a severe or persistent breach of trust.
For example, the SRM notes:
I am always typically guarded with any information I share and I always ensure that there
is a binding contract between the parties ... So I know when Im in a meeting that there is a
contract in place to protect the information I share.[SRM]
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The well-being of sta¤was also mentioned as being very much in line with security goals. The possible loss
of an attractive job can serve as a powerful deterrent. Moreover, several people noted that an individual
responsible for a serious breach of security could put at risk not only his or her job at HP Labs but also
the ability to get a job in other similar companies.
4.4 Knowledge sharing across organizational boundaries
The starting point of our analysis was the presumption that rms possess capabilities that allow them to
handle information more e¢ ciently and more securely than markets (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant,1996;
Liebeskind, 1996). So far, our discussion has focused mainly on how such capabilities manifest themselves
within HP Labs. However, some questions in our interviews were also directed at understanding whether
there are di¤erences in how information is handled internally (inside HP Labs, or between HP Labs
and other HP units) as opposed to across organizational boundaries (between HP Labs and external
organizations).
Consistent with theoretical accounts, our interviews suggest that information ows much more openly
inside HP Labs (and HP more generally) than between HP Labs and external organizations. An important
reason appears to be the availability inside HP of informal communication channels, which are sustained
by relationships of trust. For instance, the RE2 noted that:
I dont have that problem so much within HP because within HP you are always able to go
to another individual and say I am going to tell you something that you absolutely need to
know otherwise you are going to make that mistake and you cannot pass the information on
or spread it around. I would always do that if I thought that the company was going to do
something really bad and I was in a position to prevent that happening then I would always
do that. I would go to the person and say I am telling you something I really shouldnt tell
you, I am only telling you in order to prevent something bad happening. On the other hand,
when you are dealing with people outside there is information which you can never reveal no
matter how badly that will impact on that person.[RE2]
RE2 further explained that:
you have to develop this relationship of trust, whereby if something is going wrong you tell
your manager because ultimately that is the line which you cannot cross. [...] If something is
going wrong you have to tell the guy. It is only when things are going right that you can hide
the information.[RE2]
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The interview with the external liaison o¢ cer was particularly useful to highlight di¤erences in com-
munication patterns between HP Labs and other business units within HP. The EL was a¢ liated with
HP Labs prior to being deployed to a business unit referred to as services. Services originated from a
research project in HP Labs, and EL acted there as an expert and as a liaison to coordinate between the
unit and HP Labs on related research projects still in development. He noted that:
When I was in Labs it was very much an open environment where people freely shared
information and it was assumed you were part of a community. [...] But in services most people
work from home and there is a real breakdown in communication where typically everything
happens over a phone. So it is somewhat blurred regarding how sparse the information ows
are between people. And, the managers will hold the information centrally and feed it out as
appropriate.[EL]
This quote supports the point made above that distance contributes to compartmentalizing informa-
tion. In addition, EL suggests that managers often engage in a gatekeeping role, for they tend to relay
information on a need-to-know basis only. More generally, however, EL stressed that all employees in
contact with customers typically play a gatekeeping role. This is because rms that are clients of HP often
do not want their data to be used in the creation of new products. So the consultants undertaking IT
servicing contracts have to gate-keep in how they feed information back to the research unit. In addition,
HP sta¤ may be unwilling to prematurely reveal capabilities or products that are not fully developed.
Thus, interestingly, restrictions on informational ows are often imposed in both directions:
As a consultant and working with clients they have requested that, that information does
not get fed back into HP and equally HP running a research project were requesting that the
research information was not fed to the client.[EL]
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
The goal of this paper is to examine how organizations internally protect their knowledge. The analysis
emphasizes a basic trade-o¤ between letting employees communicate freely with each other, which im-
proves decision-making but increases the risk of information leakage, and restricting communication ows,
which worsen decision-making but mitigates security risk. We argue that this trade-o¤ is mediated by
several factors, such as the sensitivity of information, employee trustworthiness and investments in legal
protection mechanisms.
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Our case study of HP Labs provides suggestive evidence in support of the proposed framework. The
framework postulates that tasks are heterogeneous in terms of security risk and their importance for
decision-making. Hence, even within the same organization, some tasks or information items may be sub-
ject to more stringent security requirements than others. We found that protecting client condentiality
(especially when the client is a government agency) is always perceived to be of the utmost importance,
typically much more so than protecting technical information. Thus, there seems to be signicant variation
across knowledge items in security costs.
Prima facie, our ndings appear to contradict Demski et al.s (1999) result that market forces alone are
typically insu¢ cient to induce rms to protect customer information. However, their result is premised on
the absence of e¤ective contractual and reputational solutions to the problem of information leakage. By
contrast, the individuals we interviewed pointed out that there are often signicant built-in penalties for
the exposure of sensitive information (including criminal liability in certain cases). But more important
than legal remedies is arguably the risk of losing future business, both from the client whose information
was exposed and from other prospective customers. Thus, our evidence suggests that, in some situations
at least, market forces can go a long way towards mitigating the problem of customer information leakage.
Our framework highlights two factors that tend to reduce the likelihood and cost of information
leakage: employee trustworthiness and investments in legal protection mechanisms. Both factors were
noted in our interviews. Concerning legal remedies, non-disclosure clauses were generally perceived as
e¤ective deterrents. Such clauses are typically included into contracts, such as those with employees,
external consultants, and clients. By contrast, and quite surprisingly to us, hardly any mention was made
of patents. We conjecture that this may be related to the nature of research at HP Labs, which tends
to be quite close to the basic-research end of the spectrum and focuses on computing. For this type of
knowledge, patent protection may not be the most e¤ective protection mechanism (Cohen et al., 2000;
Arundel, 2001; Thomä and Bizer, 2013).
The issue of trust featured very prominently in all our interviews. The Lab Director himself noted
that HP Labsculture is not so much about formal rules or the letter of the law, as about the spirit
of the place and treating sta¤ with respect(LD quotes). HP Labs trusts its employees to do the right
thing on balance, thus pushing decision-making authority quite low down the hierarchy. The individuals
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we interviewed consistently emphasized discretion and the use of experience as key factors in deciding
on how information should be disseminated. Training and mentoring were also perceived as important
tools for establishing the appropriate norms and standards of behavior regarding security. This evidence
is supportive of a vast literature highlighting the role of trust in facilitating information exchange (Uzzi,
1996, 1997; Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Dyer and Chu, 2003; Levin and Cross, 2004), delegation of authority
(Arrow, 1974; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012), and the management of complexity (Poppo and
Zenger, 2002; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999; Gulati and Nickerson 2008). In particular, mutual
trust is believed to be a critical precondition for the sharing and development of knowledge in innova-
tive organizations (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Adler, 2001). However, Bantel and Jackson (1989) and
Molina-Morales and Martínez-Fernández (2009) caution that excessively close interpersonal and interor-
ganizational relationships can have a adverse e¤ect on risk-taking, innovation and value creation.
Our interviews also reveal that the well-being of sta¤ is regarded as being very much in line with
security goals, since the loss of an attractive job can serve as a powerful deterrent. Our interpretation
of this piece of evidence is that the employment relationship in HP Labs contains elements of what is
sometimes termed a relational contract (Baker et al., 2002; Gibbons and Henderson, 2012; Baldwin
and Henkel, 2015). In economics, relational contracts are non-binding commitments sustained through
reputational concerns. A typical example is an employers o¤er of continuity of employment, discretionary
wage increases and good working conditions in exchange for appropriate behavior. One could view HPs
e¤orts to create a positive working relationship within the company and HP Labs in particular as an
attempt to incentivize good security practices.
Our framework posits that open and unrestricted communication is important to improve decision-
making and foster innovation. We found evidence that for HP Labs it is critical to provide high-quality
and reliable products, as captured for instance by the concern that revealing HP Labscapabilities or new
products too early may run the risk of creating inappropriate expectations on the part of customers or
other HP units. However, our subjects more often tended to emphasize the costs of delay that security
requirements sometimes impose. For instance, some noted that while tagging procedures are e¤ective at
controlling information, they also tend to delay the distribution of source codes, thus increasing the time it
takes for the project to be completed. These observations suggest that our framework is incomplete, and
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the analysis should be augmented with a discussion of delay costs, as in information-processing models
(e.g., Radner, 1993; Patacconi, 2009).
These ndings have implications for innovation management. The innovation literature nds that
secrecy and lead-time advantage are two of the most important ways in which rms can prot from their
R&D activities (Cohen et al., 2000; Arundel, 2001; Thomä and Bizer, 2013). Our evidence suggests
that there may be a conict between these two appropriability mechanisms: security protocols may help
mitigate the risk of information leakage, but may also create delays and compromise lead-time advantage.
The need to quickly acquire capabilities and reduce delays in new product development may also help
explain changes in publication practices at Apple. Apple has traditionally been a one of the most secretive
companies among the U.S. tech giants. But competition to develop more powerful AI is changing that.
Apple, Google, Facebook and Microsoft are now all involved in a race to use AI for a myriad of applications
including search, face recognition, self-driving cars and medical diagnosis. With competition intensifying,
the cost of delay is arguably rising. This may explain why, when Apple hired computer scientist Russ
Salakhutdinov from Carnegie Mellon last year as its new head of AI, he was immediately allowed to break
Apples code of secrecy by blogging and giving talks. At a major machine-learning science conference late
last year in Barcelona, Salakhutdinov made the point of announcing that Apple would start publishing,
too. He showed a slide: Can we publish? Yes.(Regalado, 2017). Thus, consistent with our arguments,
it seems that secrecy must sometimes be sacriced when competition is erce and time is of the essence.
Finally, research suggests that rms possess capabilities that allow them to handle information more
e¢ ciently and more securely than markets (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant,1996; Liebeskind, 1996). We
found that information tends to ow much more openly inside HP Labs and HP more generally than
between HP Labs and external organizations. This appears to be related to the availability inside HP of
informal communication channels, which are sustained by relationships of trust. Socialization mechanisms
that engender trust among co-workers and allow them to internalize social norms may therefore be powerful
factors facilitating information sharing.
Our study is subject to many limitations. The number of interviews is very small. We investigated
security practices within a single lab located in one particular country, so we cannot determine to what
extent our ndings (such as the perceived e¤ectiveness of legal instruments and built-in penalties) are
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contingent on the specic institutional environment. The research conducted in the lab also mainly
focuses on specic areas of engineering and computer science. Extending the sample to multiple locations
and labs performing di¤erent types of research would be an interesting avenue for future work. We also
believe that it would be worth developing some of the themes featured in our interviews further. Under
what circumstances are internalized codes of behavior likely to be e¤ective? What is the role of relational
contracts in promoting good security practices? Thus, in the spirit of Eisenhardt (1989), the case study
evidence suggests ways to create better theory.
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Moderating factors:
• Value of information to other employees; 
sensitivity of the information if leaked
• Employee trustworthiness
• Legal protection mechanisms 








Procedures governing  knowledge 
sharing and protection
Figure 1: Factors affecting procedures for knowledge sharing and protection 
Context:
Intra- vs. inter-organizational 
knowledge sharing
Abbr. Title Brief description of role
LD Lab director The most senior member on the site and a VP of the firm.
SRM Senior research
Manager
One of several senior specialists managing large projects. The teams
working for the SRM are not normally fixed, as these projects
frequently require differing skills.
RE1 Research engineer One of the specialist engineers who undertakes tasks within the
research projects commissioned at HP Labs.




A specialist that is not part of HP Labs, but works closely with them to
deliver information to the researchers and ensure that specific business
requirements are met. Is a former HP Labs research engineer deployed
specifically to the business side.
Appendix 1: Designation and role of interviewees
Appendix 2: Interview Script 
1. What is your position with respect to HP Labs? 
 
2. Could you tell us about the methods used to protect sensitive information within HP Labs and in HP Labs 
relationships with other HP business units and with external partners? 
 
3. Some follow-up questions and/or suggestions for organizing answers: 
 
a. To what extent do the methods for protecting information rely on formal procedures such as contract 
clauses or internal company regulations?  
 
b. To what extend does the protection of information depend on informal methods?  
 
c. To what extend does the protection of information depend on organizational methods such as restricting 
communication among employees or finely subdividing jobs so that only senior managers can see the 
full picture? 
 
d. To what extend do managers perform a role as information gatekeepers? 
 
e. Is there any specific instance where the need to protect information has conflicted with other HP goals? 
 
4. How does the extent to which HP uses the various methods for managing information that you mentioned vary 
with the situation? 
 
5. Compared to the procedures for protecting information within HP Labs, 
 
a. Are there additional and/or different methods in place when staff at HP Lab collaborates with staff in 
other HP divisions? 
 
b. Are there additional and/or different methods that you would use in relationships and collaborations 
with external partners? 
 
6. Can you give some examples of how information is managed differently when collaborations involve external 
partners? Are there examples of restrictions on exchanging information imposed by external partners (e.g., 
government agencies)?  
 
7. From the perspective of information security, what are some of the perceived risks and other costs of exchanging 
information within HP Labs? 
 
a. Between HP Labs and other HP units? 
 
b. Between HP Labs and external partners? 
 
c. Within HP, who is responsible for balancing the benefits versus costs of exchanging information? 
 
8. Additional question to be possibly answered via written material such as an organization chart. Could you give 
us an overview of HP Labs organizational structure and its links with other business units within HP and with 
other external business partners?  
Themes and coding Supporting evidence
Procedures for knowledge sharing and protection
Procedures for knowledge sharing and protection were
documented and tabulated, follow-up discussions were
made, with the complete list of procedures mentioned
previously made available.
Methods for protecting information were classified as
follows: (1) formal (e.g., contract clauses, patents, internal
company regulations); (2) organizational (e.g., restrictions
to communication flows, task fragmentation); (3) informal
(e.g., internalized norms, relational contracts); (4) other.
Costs incurred to protect information were scored as
follows: (1) negligible cost; (2) significant cost. In most
cases, cost was measured in terms of time taken to
accomplish a task.
The integrity of an answer was classified as follows: (1) no
response; (2) lack of direct knowledge, but able to provide
specific examples; (3) direct knowledge of a case.
“[Communication within HP] works well unless you are using very private material. Clear text emails are fine, this is assumed. If it is HP private
information then you have to use a certificate based secure line.” [RE1]
"I am always typically guarded with any information I share and I always ensure that there is a binding contract between the parties ... So I know
when I'm in a meeting that there is a contract in place to protect the information I share." [SRM]
"If we have information from our business units that is sensitive then it is not widely circulated across the organization. That is more controlled.
Similarly, if we have information from partners this is tightly controlled. If we are working with this type of information, which is intranet based
we will be working in quite a guarded even in the immediate organization. [...] The only places where we would be really tight, is our stuff
related to the government. This would not make it onto the intranet. We would keep that sort of material of the intranet, keep it separately on
machines that are air gapped. But this is a very small amount of material and the philosophy is that you would destroy it as quickly as you can. "
[LD]
“Information is typically shared on an ad hoc basis and you have to know the right person to talk to, to be able to get access to the information
in the first place. […] You have to know the specific person and you would expect that you could have access to carry out a specific role, but it is
about knowing the right person.” [RE2]
“Typically because I work with labs in terms of research the tendency is not to share in my business unit because it could land in someone's lap
in sales and would feel they could offer something that could differentiate HP to the market place. This would be in order to make a brand new
sale and get more customers. Now that would mean delivery of research early into the market and that is not in HP Labs interest. So I am quite
straight in what I do in terms of info flow between the two.” [EL]
Intra- vs. inter-organizational knowledge sharing
Experience within and outside HP Labs was noted.
Informal procedures were documented and tabulated;
same procedure as above used coding and in the follow-up.
"When I was in Labs it was very much an open environment where people freely shared information and it was assumed you were part of a
community. [...] But in services most people work from home and there is a real breakdown in communication where typically everything
happens over a phone. So it is somewhat blurred regarding how sparse the information flows are between people. And, the managers will hold
the information centrally and feed it out as appropriate." [EL]
“[Redacted specific name] there were clear rules about information I could not send out via clear text emails and this limited the way were able
to function. We had developments where it was all being centrally managed in a portal. However, they were unable to send out notifications
from this portal because that would have violated the clear text rule. This actually impeded the work because I did not know when things were
changing. This meant that I had to manually check where if this just had been internally in HP the exchange would have been much easier.”
[RE2]
Appendix 3: Themes, coding and selected interview quotes
Online Appendix: A simple model of knowledge protection
This appendix develops a simple model of an organization that must carry out a project such as developing
new software. The project is composed of several tasks which must be coordinated with each other. The
tasks are heterogeneous, both in terms of their security risk and coordination costs. Our goal is to identify
how internal and environmental factors a¤ect the choice between open and restricted communication
modes.
Consider a project composed of n+1 tasks. Each task i = 1; 2; :::; n+1 is assigned to a di¤erent agent
(or group of agents). The agents are also indexed by i, with the understanding that agent i performs
task i. Agents possess private information about their tasks. For instance, agent i may have acquired
information about a set of clients or task i related technology. Private information is modeled by assuming
that each agent i privately observes the realization of a random variable ~i.1 The random variables ~i,
i = 1; 2; :::; n + 1, are normally and independently distributed with mean i and variance $2i . This
information is common knowledge. The realization of ~i is denoted by i.
Tasks must be coordinated for the project to succeed. Following Dessein and Santos (2006), we assume
that to coordinate task i with all the other tasks j 6= i, the agent in charge of task i must perform a
string of n actions ai = faijgj 6=i. If aij = j , then task i is perfectly coordinated with task j. In general,
however, coordination will be less than perfect. The expected coordination cost which is incurred when






where cj parametrizes the importance of task j on the overall project architecture and E[:] is the expec-
tations operator.
To tailor the actions aij to the task specications j , the agents can communicate. Agent j, in
particular, can send a signal sji to agent i which conveys information about j . Since the random
variables ~i are independently distributed, the only information which is relevant to i when choosing aij is
sji. We assume that agents choose their coordinating actions aij(sji) so as to minimize the coordination
1The model can easily be generalized to the case where agent i privately observes the realization of mi random variables
~ih, h = 1; :::;mi. See Remark 1 below.
1
cost Cij incurred by the organization. Thus, we abstract from the possibility of agency problems in the
choice of aij . It is a standard result in decision theory that the function aij(sji) which minimizes the






(see, e.g., De Groot, 1970). We consider two types of communication modes. These communication modes
di¤er along three dimensions: (i) the amount of information that they make available for coordination
purposes, (ii) the security risk associated with their use, and (iii) their costs (in particular, the screening
costs). The key trade-o¤ we emphasize is between greater security risk when a more open communication
mode is selected, and loss of coordination when a more restricted or secure communication mode is
selected. Intuitively, as more agents get access to information, coordination improves, but the chance of
information leakage also increases.
Open communication. If communication from j to i is open or unrestricted, then j fully reveals his
information to i. As a result, i will observe a perfectly informative signal:2
sUji = j : (3)
It follows that the coordination cost associated with is action in support of task j, Cij , is zero, since i can
set aij(sUji) = j .
3 There are however two additional costs associated with unrestricted communication.
First, the risk of information leakage is greater when communication is unrestricted. Let Rj(k) denote
the expected security risk to the organization when information about task j is communicated openly to
k agents and securely to n   k agents. Let p (; ) 2 (0; 1) be the probability that an agent who learns
task j information openly will leak this information. Here  parametrizes the extent to which employees
can be trusted with secrets, and  parametrizes the knowledge protection intensity of the rm. For
instance,  could measure the organizations e¤orts to train and mentor its employees about security, and
 may measure its propensity to patent or to impose non-disclosure or non-compete clauses, as well as
2The assumption that the signal is perfectly informative is just for simplicity. As will become clear in the following, what
matters is that the signals under open communication are more precise than the signals in the restricted communication
scenario.
3Note that in this model it is not necessarily the case that if j unrestrictedly communicates with i, then i unrestrictedly
communicates with j.
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environmental factors such as the strength of intellectual property rights in a country. We assume that
p (; ) is weakly decreasing in both  and . For simplicity, we assume that the probability that an agent
who learns task j information securely will leak this information is zero.
For most of the analysis, we posit that the cost of information leakage is borne by the organization
only once, when the rst leak occurs. We also assume that agents decide independently whether to leak
the information. These assumptions are standard in related theoretical work (e.g., Baldwin and Henkel,
2015). However, relaxing them, for instance by assuming that security costs are additive in the number
of leaks, would not qualitatively change the results of the paper (see Remark 1 below).
Given our assumptions, the expected security risk to the organization when information about task j
is communicated openly to k agents and securely to n  k agents is
Rj(k) = rj(1  [1  p (; )]k) (4)
where rj denotes the cost to the organization when information about task j is leaked. Hence, Rj(k) is
increasing with respect to k, but at a rate that, whilst always positive, is decreasing with respect to k.
This is an essentially crossing the rubiconapproach, which we will talk about in Section 5 in more detail,
it is the initial block of potentially un-secure disclosures that form the majority of the risk, the precise
proportion depends upon p (; ).4
Security risks may arise because agents may misplace the information, or may leak it to competitors.
Also, the organization may fear that if agents have access to valuable information (e.g., a client list), they
might decide to leave the organization and set up competing businesses.
The second type of cost associated with open communication is the time and e¤ort that must be spent
crafting messages. We assume that for each message sUji that it is sent, a communication cost t must be
incurred. This communication cost is also eventually borne by the organization because the organization
must compensate its employees for their e¤orts.
Restricted (or secure) communication. Under restricted communication, messages are screened.
Screening results in a ltering of sensitive information that mitigates security concerns. Specically,
4This specication assumes that agent j (the agent who is initially endowed with the information) never leaks it. This
assumption could easily be relaxed without changing any of the qualitative results of the paper. If agent j could also leak
the information, for instance, we would simply have that Rj(k) = rj(1  [1  p (; )]k+1).
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we assume that under restricted communication, security risk is zero. The cost of screening is that
task coordination may be impaired. To capture this, we posit that, for all i and j, i 6= j, restricted
communication from j to i results in i receiving a signal
sRji = j + ji (5)
where the variables ji are random normal variables independently distributed with mean 0 and variance
2. 2 can be interpreted as an (inverse) measure of the quality of the screening technology. It is clear
from inspection of (5) and (3) that restricted communication conveys less (more noisy) information than
unrestricted communication.
In practice, communications can be screened in at least two ways. First, communications may be
mediated by gatekeepers. For instance, an engineer may communicate data only to his manager, and the
manager may then decide to transmit part of this information to other agents. Second, communications
may be monitored, which may give rise to self-censorship. Both mediated and monitored communications
may result in messages that are less informative but also less risky than the messages sent through open
communication channels.
Given (5), the coordination cost Cij associated with restricted communication can easily be computed.
Indeed, because j and ji are normally and independently distributed, the conditional mean and variance
of j given the signal sRji are given by















(see, e.g., De Groot, 1970). Using the law of iterated expectations, one thus obtains5
Cij = j(






Lastly, we specify communication costs. Restricted communication is associated with two types of com-
munication costs. First, as in the case of unrestricted communication, the organization incurs a unit cost
5 In fact the nested expectation is decomposed by Cij = cjE[(aij(sRji)  j)2] = cjEsRji





of t whenever a message sRji is created. In addition, there are screening costs s per message. Thus total
communication costs for message under restricted communication is t+ s.
Analysis. We now examine how the organization should design its communication system. The goal of
the organization is to minimize the cost of carrying out the project, which is given by the sum of the
security, coordination and communication costs.6 The choice variables are the communication modes for
each message sij . Note that the problem of selecting communication modes for agent is messages can
be analyzed separately from the problem of selecting communication modes for agent js messages. How
message sjh is communicated has in fact no bearing on the costs and benets associated with the di¤erent
communication modes for agent is messages, j 6= i. Thanks to the decomposability of the organizational
problem, we can thus focus on a representative task i.
Our rst result shows that, for each task i, the optimal choice of communication mode (open or
restricted/secure) takes a simple form.
Lemma A1. Information on task i is either communicated openly to all agents, or is communicated
securely to all agents.
Proof of Lemma A1. Suppose that task i information is communicated openly to k = 0; 1; :::; n agents
and securely to n   k agents. As noted in the body of the paper, the total cost associated with task i
(inclusive of security and coordination costs) is
Costi(k) = ri(1  [1  p (; )]k) + (n  k)i(2)ci + nt+ (n  k) s:
The organization must minimize this cost with respect to k (or, equivalently, maximize  Costi(k)). Ignor-
ing integer constraints, one can di¤erentiate  Costi(k) and obtain  @2Costi=@k2 = ri[1 p (; )]k(ln(1 
p (; )))2  0. Because  Costi(k) is convex in k 2 [0; n], the solution of the maximization problem will
typically be a corner solution: either all the information is communicated openly (k = n) or all the
information is communicated securely (k = 0). This proves Lemma A1. 
To see why Lemma A1 is true, consider the general case where agent i communicates openly with
k = 0; 1; :::; n agents and securely with n   k agents. The total cost associated with task i (inclusive of
6Although revenues are not included in the model, the analysis could easily be generalized to incorporate them. See
Patacconi (2009) for an example in a similar context.
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security and coordination costs) is
ri(1  [1  p (; )]k) + (n  k)i(2)ci + nt+ (n  k) s: (8)
Ignoring integer constraints, one can easily show that these costs are concave in k. The organization
must minimize these costs with respect to k. Thus, the solution of this problem will typically be a
corner solution: either all task i information is communicated openly (k = n) or all the information is
communicated securely (k = 0).7 Intuitively, because security costs are incurred as soon as the rst leak
occurs, the marginal security benets to restricting communication are increasing. If it is optimal to
restrict some communication channels originating from task i, then it is optimal to restrict all of them.
Lemma A1 is useful because, when selecting the optimal communication modes for task i information,
the organization has only to compare the costs associated with fully secure communication, n[i(2)ci +
t+ s], to the costs associated with fully open communication, ri(1  [1  p (; )]n) + nt. Proposition A1
characterizes the optimal choice of communication modes for all tasks i = 1; 2; :::; n+ 1.
Proposition A1. Let tasks be indexed so that 	i  ri(1  [1 p (; )]n) ni(2)ci is weakly increasing
in i. There exists an integer l̂ 2 [0; n+ 1] such that, for all tasks i  l̂, open communication is optimal,
and for all tasks i > l̂, restricted communication is optimal, where l̂ is the largest integer such that:
ri(1  [1  p (; )]n)  ni(2)ci  ns: (9)
The number of tasks l̂ for which open communication is optimal is weakly increasing in
 
 ri; ci; ; ; 2

.
Proof of Proposition A1. The proof of Proposition A1 follows from Lemma A1 and the comparison
between ri(1  [1  p (; )]n) + nt and n[i(2)ci + t+ s]. Open communication of task i information is
optimal when ri(1  [1 p (; )]n)+nt  n[i(2)ci+ t+ s] or, equivalently, when ri(1  [1 p (; )]n) 
ni(
2)ci  ns. Because ri(1   [1   p (; )]n)   ni(2)ci is weakly increasing in i, all information
regarding tasks with index i less than or equal to some critical threshold l̂ is optimally communicated
openly. The comparative statics result is obtained by considering parameter changes that make the
quantity ri(1  [1  p (; )]n)  ni(2)ci smaller. 
7 In the eventuality that all admissible k are optimal, we assume that the organization also selects a corner solution.
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When condition (9) holds, then the information on task i is deemed sensitive and communications are
restricted (or secure). Conversely, when (9) does not hold, then the information on task i is not deemed
sensitive and communications are open. Intuitively, it is optimal to restrict/screen communications when
the cost of information leakage is large (ri big) and task coordination is unimportant (ci small). Re-
stricting communication channels is also less likely to be optimal when employees are trustworthy and
the organization has invested in legal protection mechanisms ( and  are high). The greater the noise
induced by security restrictions, 2, the more likely it is the open communication mode will be selected.
In addition, the model also shows that achieving coordination through communication is only impor-
tant when $2i is not very small. Intuitively, $
2
i measures the extent to which task i can deviate from
the initial specication i. If $2i is small, then the need for adaptation is limited and, as a result, the
need for (ex post) communication is reduced. If $2i is su¢ ciently small, the best communication mode
is arguably no communication at all (restricted or unrestricted). Coordination can perfectly be achieved
through initial planning (in the model, by simply setting aij = j for all i; j).
Remark 1. The model assumes that the organization bears the full cost of leakage of task j information
as soon as the rst leak occurs. An alternative polar assumption would be that the cost of information
leakage is additive in the number of leaks that occur. Then the expected security risk associated with
communicating openly task j information to k agents would be Rj(k) = krjp (; ). Lemma A1 would
continue to hold and condition (9) would become rjp (; )   i(2)ci  s: All the comparative statics
results of the paper would remain unchanged.
Remark 2. The coordination costs ci can be interpreted as a modularity parameter. Consider a setting
where a group of agents i must integrate their task with other tasks. If ci is small, then group i can
spend little time tailoring the design of their systems component to the characteristics of the other
components (high modularity). However, as ci grows large, then coordination with other groups becomes
more important (lower degree of modularity).
Remark 3. A di¤erent interpretation of the network of agents i = 1; :::; n + 1 is as a collection of pos-
sibly independent contractors. Under this interpretation, both stronger IP protection laws (which would
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increase ) or greater societal trust (which would increase ) would enable the disintegration of the verti-
cally integrated rm, because they reduce the need for centralized monitoring. This information security
argument complements existing explanations for the trends toward outsourcing and vertical disintegration
based on the codication of previously tacit knowledge and the growth of technology markets.
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